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This article discusses how the Chicago Fed National Activity Index—a monthly  
index designed to gauge economic activity and related inflationary pressures—  
can be used as an indicator of business cycle turning points.
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The Chicago Fed National Activity 
Index (CFNAI) is a monthly index of 
U.S. economic activity constructed to 
summarize variation in 85 data series 






housing; and sales,  
orders, and inven-
tories.1 The index 
is designed as a co-
incident indicator 
of national eco-
nomic activity and 
serves as a leading 
indicator of activity-
related inflationary 
pressures. In this  
Chicago Fed Letter, 
I reexamine the re-
lationship between 
the CFNAI and 
business cycle turn-
ing points.
The CFNAI is an example of a “Gold-
ilocks” index. In essence, this means 
that the information in various data  
series on national economic activity is 
combined in a way to reflect deviations 
around a trend rate of economic growth. 
Accordingly, the CFNAI is normalized 
to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. In the Goldilocks  
terminology, this means that a zero  
value of the index is “just right,” in that 
the economy is proceeding along its 
historical growth path. A negative value 
of the index is “cold,” in that growth is 
below average, while a positive value is 
“hot,” in that it is above average. 
The CFNAI can be very volatile, since 
many of the monthly series that make 
up the index vary significantly from 
month to month. For this reason, the 
focus is often given to the three-month 
moving average of the index, i.e., the 
CFNAI-MA3 (figure 1), which smoothes 
the month-to-month variations over 
time in order to provide a more consis-
tent picture of variations in economic 
growth around trend. When the values 
of this index reach certain levels that 
have been identified in previous re-
search as “too hot,” the likelihood of 
an inflationary period rises; when it 
gets “too cold,” the likelihood of a  
recession rises.2
Historical performance
Here, I focus on those levels of the 
three-month moving average index 
that are typical of economic activity 
during recessions as identified by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). These “threshold values” iden-
tify large deviations of the CFNAI-MA3 
from its mean of zero given its stan-
dard deviation of one. For instance,  
a CFNAI-MA3 value below –0.7, or 
greater than two-thirds of one standard 
deviation from its mean, is defined as 
1. CFNAI-MA3 and business cycles
Notes: CFNAI-MA3 is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index’s three-month moving 
average. Shading indicates official periods of recession as identified by the National  
Bureau of Economic Research; the dashed vertical line indicates the most recent busi-
ness cycle peak. A CFNAI-MA3 value below –0.70 following a period of economic ex-
pansion indicates an increasing likelihood that a recession has begun. A CFNAI-MA3 
value above +0.20 following a period of economic contraction indicates a significant 
likelihood that a recession has ended.
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–0.7indicating a significant likelihood that 
a recession has begun. Similarly, a re-
cession is indicated to have likely end-
ed based on the CFNAI-MA3 returning 
to a level of +0.2 after having crossed 
the –0.7 threshold. 
Historically, both thresholds have per-
formed fairly well with respect to the 
recession timing as determined by the 
NBER (figure 1). The –0.7 threshold 
has correctly predicted a recession 
month with 86% accuracy since 1967, 
identifying the beginning of a reces-
sion within three months on average; 
the +0.2 threshold has correctly pre-
dicted the end of each recession since 
1967 within eight months on average, 
with no false positive signals. However, 
the performance of the latter thresh-
old has varied significantly over time, 
with the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions 
ending 18 months on average before 
+0.2 was reached. 
Given the subpar performance of the 
index in identifying the end of the two 
most recent recessions, it may be use-
ful to consider alternative definitions 
of the likelihood of a recession’s end.  
I propose here two such alternatives. 
These alternatives seek to make use  
of auxiliary information on U.S. reces-
sions since 1967 and unify information 
contained in the CFNAI-MA3 on busi-
ness cycle turning points around a single 
threshold value of –0.7.
The first alternative relies on the fact 
that since 1967 all recessions have  
lasted for a minimum of six months. 
Using this information, a new thresh-
old can be constructed where the end 
of a recession is signaled when the 
three-month moving average index  
attains a value greater than –0.7 at least 
seven months after an NBER-defined 
recession has begun. Using this defini-
tion, the CFNAI correctly predicts the 
end of each recession since 1967 within 
one month on average, and all six of 
Notes: CFNAI-MA3 is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index’s three-month moving average. Shading indicates official periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research; 
the vertical line indicates the most recent business cycle peak.
2. Four categories of the CFNAI-MA3
A. Production and income
index
C. Personal consumption and housing
index
B. Employment, unemployment, and hours
index
D. Sales, orders, and inventories
index
Notes: CFNAI-MA3 is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index’s three-month moving average. Shading indicates official periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research; the dashed vertical line indicates the most recent business cycle peak.
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the false positive signals from this defi-
nition are contained in the two reces-
sions of the 1970s. 
Another alternative is to base the defi-
nition of the likelihood of a recession’s 
end on the CFNAI-MA3 attaining a value 
greater than –0.7 following the point 
in time during an NBER recession when 
it first fell below this threshold. This al-
ternative removes any potential error 
in identifying a recession’s likely end-
ing point from incorrectly identifying 
August of this year, the CFNAI-MA3 has 
increased by nearly 2.5 standard devia-
tions. Despite this steady improvement, 
at –1.09 as of the September 28, 2009, 
release, the index continues to be below 
the –0.7 threshold. Substantial economic 
slack exists in the U.S. economy as evi-
denced by the fact that the three-month 
moving average remains just slightly more 
than one standard deviation below its 
mean. However, the index now indicates 
a level of economic activity above the 
the index is clear, since it took this cate-
gory a substantially longer period of 
time to return to trend. 
In contrast, the contributions of the 
production and income (panel A) and 
sales, orders, and inventories (panel D) 
categories tend to turn negative more 
quickly during a recession and turn 
positive once the recovery begins. That 
said, the contribution of the personal 
consumption and housing category 
(panel C) demonstrates substantial vari-
ability in its behavior during recessions 
(sometimes leading, sometimes lagging); 
and in the case of the 2001 recession, 
it shows no discernible impact.
These observations are in line with well-
documented business cycle facts. For 
instance, it is well known that the labor 
market tends to be a lagging indicator 
of the business cycle. Furthermore, the 
casual definition of a recession as two 
quarters of negative real gross domestic 
product growth conforms well to the 
fact that production and income indi-
cators tend to decline at the onset of 
recessions. Finally, the behavior of the 
sales, orders, and inventories category re-
flects the fact that declining sales and 
orders that accompany a recession are 
typically followed by liquidations of  
inventories, only to have firms build 
them up again when demand improves. 
Taking a closer look at the categories of indicators that  
make up the index can be helpful in explaining the ongoing 
weakness in the economy in relation to past recessions. 
its beginning. By this definition, the 
CFNAI also correctly predicts the end 
of each recession within one month on 
average, with four false positive signals 
that all occur during the 1969–70 reces-
sion. Thus, both of these alternatives 
more accurately describe the timing of 
recessions since 1980.
The monthly release of the CFNAI is  
a benefit that can be exploited in real 
time to determine business cycle turn-
ing points. For instance, with regard  
to the current recession, the index  
correctly identified December 2007  
as the start date in its March 24, 2008, 
release, nearly eight months before the 
official declaration by the NBER. How-
ever, using the index as an indicator of 
a recession’s end in real time is more 
difficult. The real-time use of both my 
alternative threshold definitions pre-
supposes that the recession has already 
been identified by the NBER. Given the 
length of a typical recession and the 
performance of the index in identify-
ing the beginning of a recession, this 
concern should be minimal.  
CFNAI indicator categories
The history of the index shown in  
figure 1 demonstrates that the current 
recession marks the steepest decline in 
economic activity since the 1973–75  
recession, and possibly the longest since 
the 1981–82 recession, depending on 
its official end. From January through 
trough of the two most recent reces-
sions prior to the current one. 
Taking a closer look at the categories 
of indicators3 that make up the index 
can be helpful in explaining the ongo-
ing weakness in the economy in rela-
tion to past recessions. It is well known 
that the recoveries from the 1990–91 
and 2001 recessions were muted in 
part because of the sluggish response 
of the labor market. This points out a 
potential weakness in the relationship 
between the CFNAI-MA3 and business 
cycle turning points.4 Recessions are 
typically defined based on widespread 
changes in economic activity. However, 
when individual sectors of the econo-
my diverge sharply from the rest, this 
information can provide further insight 
into the nature of a recession and the 
subsequent recovery. Therefore, looking 
just at the CFNAI-MA3 may obscure 
potentially useful information.
Consider figure 2, which charts the con-
tributions to the CFNAI-MA3 from each 
of its four categories of indicators. One 
can see notable differences in them over 
the business cycle. For instance, the con-
tribution of the employment, unemploy-
ment, and hours category (panel B) 
tends to lag the CFNAI-MA3 as a whole. 
This category’s greatest negative con-
tribution to the index is generally made 
near the end of a recession. Also, in the 
case of the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions, 
the impact of the jobless recovery on Behavior that deviates from these norms 
can, thus, be illustrative of the type of 
recession and recovery to be expected. 
For instance, the contribution from 
the personal consumption and hous-
ing category reached an all-time low 
during the current recession, with  
the beginning of the decline in this  
category preceding the recession by 
over a year. The extent of the decline, 
reflecting the struggles of the residen-
tial housing market after home prices 
began to fall sharply in 2006, is un-
precedented in the index’s history.  
As of the September 28, 2009, release, 
despite some recent improvement in 
residential housing indicators, the 
contribution to the CFNAI-MA3 from 
this category was still –0.50. Given the 
persistence of this component, it is 
likely to be a drag on economic activity 
for some time to come. 
That said, looking at the employment, 
unemployment, and hours category  
offers some hope for the beginning  
of a recovery. The negative contribu-
tion of this category bottomed out in 
February 2009. Based on its behavior 
during past recessions, this often has 
served as an early signal of a recovery. 
However, such a signal has not always 
been accurate. For instance, during 
the 1981–82 recession this category ex-
hibited a W-like pattern, rising and fall-
ing more than once before the end of 
the recession. In addition, the amount 
of resource slack indicated by the cate-
gory’s August 2009 contribution of –0.58 
also suggests further skepticism about 
a full recovery is warranted. 
Still, in recent months, contributions 
from both the production and income 
and the sales, orders, and inventories 
categories have also improved consid-
erably. The contributions of both groups 
bottomed out at the CFNAI-MA3’s most 
recent trough of January 2009. In the 
past, a neutral contribution of these 
groups during a recession has been  
an early sign of a recovery. As of the 
September 28, 2009, release, the contri-
bution of the production and income 
category had turned slightly positive, 
while the sales, orders, and inventories 
category remained slightly negative. Thus, 
it appears likely that recovery from the 
current recession had not yet reached 
full swing as of August 2009, but early 
signs of recovery are apparent. 
Conclusion
The CFNAI has historically performed 
well in relation to NBER recession dates. 
However, its accuracy in determining 
the ends of recent recessions has been 
subpar. Adjusting the way the three-
month moving average index is inter-
preted based on alternative definitions 
of the likelihood of a recession’s end 
can help to improve its performance  
in this regard. Furthermore, individual 
inspection of the four categories of in-
dicators that make up the index can 
provide additional information on the 
nature of a recession and the subsequent 
recovery. Applying these methods to 
the current recession offers some signs 
of a recovery.
1 Additional information on the construc-
tion of the CFNAI can be found at  
www.chicagofed.org/cfnai. 
2  See Charles L. Evans, Chin Te Liu, and 
Genevieve Pham-Kanter, 2002, “The 2001 
recession and the Chicago Fed National 
Activity Index: Identifying business cycle 
turning points,” Economic Perspectives, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 26, 
No. 3, Third Quarter, pp. 26–43.
3  The four indicator categories discussed 
here were made publicly available with 
the September 28, 2009, release at www.
chicagofed.org/cfnai. 
4  See Mary Daly, Bart Hobijn, and Joyce 
Kwok, 2009, “Jobless recovery redux?,” 
FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco, No. 2009-18, June 5, 
available at www.frbsf.org/publications/
economics/letter/2009/el2009-18.html.